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Abstract
This paper presents the results of a labor supply study based on
Swedish labor market data and data from filled-in tax returns. The
model is designed to deal with non-convex budget sets (implied by the
tax and social security rules), restrictions on hours and with the
joint decisions of married couples. A novel feature is the assumption
that the basic choice variable is unobservable, here denoted match.
Given a match, wage, hours of work and non-pecuniary attributes
follow. The individuals are assumed to select the optimal match from
the maximization of utility. A specific hours of work distribution is
derived and estimated on data from 1981. The results indicate a rather
weak wage responsiveness in Swedish labor supply. Several policy
simulations have been performed.
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1. Introduction 
This Taper presents the results of a study of Swedish labor market data
and data from filled-in tax returns. This Swedish study is part of a labor
supply project at the -Central Bureau of Statistics, Oslo and the University
of Oslo in which the effects of taxation and hours restrictions on labor
supply in Nordic as well as in other European countries are studied. The
econometrics of the labor supply model is outlined ia Dagsvik and Strom
(1988) and in Dagsvik (1988).
There are three essential features of the model. First, the model is
designed to deal with non-convex budget sets because the tax and binefit
systems ia most countries are not uniformly progressive. Social security
and transfer payment rules, together with options of joint/separate tax-
ation for married couples in countries like Norway, UK, France and West-
Germany, turn an otherwise progressive structure into a regressive tax
structure over certain ranges of income. In Appendix 2 we report how the
total marginal effects from income taxes, social security, kindergarten
fees and housing allowances vary with income in Sweden. The reported vari-
ations in total marginal 'taxes' indicate that the Swedish system is far
from being uniformly progressive. The budget sets of the households are
clearly non-convex. Of course, an interesting question is how important it
is to take all details of the tax and benefit system into account when
analyzing labor supply decisions. In Dagsvik and Strom (1988) this question
is analyzed. Although the results of their study indicate that the igno-
rance of the non-convexity of the budget set might not imply biased esti--
mates, a model designed to handle a detailed specification of the budget
set is preferable in a policy simulation context.
Most of the previous labor supply studies have used the counterfactual
assumption of a convex smooth budget set (cf. Rosen (1976), Nakamura and
Nakamura (1981), Wales and Woodland (1979), Blundell et al (1987), Ransom
(1987) and Kohlase (1986). Only recently there have been attempts to take
the non-convexity properties of the tax structure into account. These at-
tempts are usually versions of the approach suggested by Burtless and
Hausman (1978) (cf. Arrufat and Zabalza (1986), Hausman (1980) and (1986)
and Hausman and Ruud, (1984)). However, from an econometric point of view
the Hausman approach is not ideal due to strong assumptions about
functional forms. Moreover, when the number of tax brackets gets large, the
Hausman model seems complicated to estimate.
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• The second key feature of the model is its ability to deal with re-
strictions on hours. In many countries individuals are not given the full
freedom to choose how many hours they would like to work. Institutional
arrangements, wage-hours contracts in unionized economies and demand con-
straints restrict severely the hours decisions of individuals. These re-
strictions are reflected in the observed frequencies of hours worked with a
typical two-peak distribution for females (full time/part time) and one-
peak distribution for males. Most likely, these concentrations over certain
narrow ranges of hours are not only due to preferences.
Finally, in contrast to the traditional approach in the analysis of
labor supply, see Killingsworth (1983) for a review, we have adopted a
theoretical framework that is related to Tinbergen (1956) in which some of
the unobservables are Choice variables. Specifically, the choice environ-
ment is assumed to consist of a set of opportunities, called matches, where
each match corresponds to a particular combination of individual abilities
offered and skills required to perform certain tasks or activities as well
as non-skill attributes of the matches. The quality of a match, relative to
the individual, depends on the "tension" between the abilities offered and
skills demanded as well as of non-pecuniary attributes related to these
activities. Each match is characterized by wage rates, hours of work and
non-pecuniary attributes. The individual is assumed to maximize his utility
with respect to latent matches.
Previous labor supply studies in Sweden are Axelsson et al (1981),
Gustafsson and Jacobson (1983) and Blomquist (1983). In Axelsson et al
hours supplied are analyzed but taxes are almost ignored. Gustafsson and
Jacobsson (1983) analyze the effects of wages, income and socio-economic
characteristics on female participation in the labor market. Taxes are
ignored. Blomquist (1983) applies the Hausman approach in the estimation of
hours supplied by men. Taxes, but not all parts of the tax and benefit
system, are included. The data set is from 1973-74 and the most noteworthy
result is a rather weak effect of wages on labor supply. The own-wage
elasticity is calculated to .08 for mean sample values of exogenous vari-
ables. Possible restrictions on hours are.ignored. In Ljones and Strom
(1986) another data set fram 1981 than the one used here is analysed. The
main difference between the two studies is that in Ljones and Strom both
participation and hours worked are analyzed while in the present paper only
hours supplied, given participation, is analysed. Futhermore, in Ljones
and Strom restrictions an hours are not accounted for in the same explicit
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way as in the present paper. Finally, the data set used in the present
paper is more carefully checked and it includes more observations than the
one used by Ljones and Strom. Comparisons of results will be given below.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 a brief description of
the model is given. Section 3 and the two appendices present data and tax
rules. Estimation results are given in Section 4 and in Section 5 we report
the results of policy simulations.
2. The mddel and econometric specifications 
The labor supply model presented in this paper is designed to analyze
the effects of taxes, transfers, income related fees and non-labor income,
on the labor supply of working, married couples.
Our point of departure is that some of the unobservables are Choice
variables and that the individual's choice of optimal values for these
variables are not made independently of the level of consumption and hours
worked. These two variables are the only choice variables that are ob-
served.
Important examples of unobserved choice variables are type of job and
type of leisure or non-market activities such as schooling, sports, house-
hold activities, etc. By type of job we understand the specific tasks per-
formed at the job, the type of qualifications demanded to perform these
tasks and other attributes of the job like working conditions, location,
etc. Similarly, non-market alternatives may be identified in an analogous
way. Non-market alternatives also demand certain skills to perform the
tasks associated with the different types of activities.
The individual's set of available opportunities depends on his abili-
ties. These are a mixture of inherited abilities and qualifications ob-
tained through education and training. Following Tinbergen (1956) the indi-
vidual's choice of market and non-market pcisitions is a process in which
the individuals try to obtain the best match of personal abilities and
skills required to perform certain activities. We extend Tinbergen's ap-
proach by assuming that attributes of the different activities might have a
direct influence on preferences. We call a particular combination of abili-
ties offered, skills required to perform certain tasks and non-skill attri-
butes associated with these tasks a match. We assume that the individual
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finds the optimal maich, among the set of feasible matches, by evaluating
how well he is fit for a particular task jointly with his taste for that
task. Matches are not observed and they are present in the model as latent
choice opportunities. For a detailed exposition of the model and its
stochastic properties the reader is referred to Dagsvik (1988) and Dagsvik
and Strom (1988).
We enumerate the universe of matches by a discrete variable, z=1,2,....
Let U(h,C,z) be the utility of hours, consumption and other characteristics
of jobs that affect utility and implied by a given match. The index z ap-
pearing in the utility function is meant to capture these other charac-
teristics.
We assume that there is no uncertainty from the individual's viewpoint,
i.e., the outcome of a choice prosess is known to him with perfect cert-
ainty. For expository reasons we start with discussing the labor supply of
single individuals.
The constraints are given by
(1) C = f(hW(z) + I)	 : Budget constraint
(2) h = H(z), z E B	 : Constraint on.hours worked.
where f(.) is the function that transforms gross income to consumption,
W(z) is a match-specific wage rate and I is non-labor income. The function
f(s) may be non-differentiable and even discontinuous at some points due to
the tax system, social security payments, etc. (see Appendix 2, especially
figures 11-14) Eq. (2) states that when z is given, hours of work is fixed	 411
and equal to H(z). The set B is the set of matches that are feasible to the
individual and it varies across individuals. Thus B accounts for the fact
that the ability to perform respective tasks are given.
The assumption that hours of work is match-specific means that certain
activities or combinations of activities require a fixed amount of time or
that hours of work is determined by the firms or by the authorities.
Subject to the constraints (1) and (2) the individual's decision
problem is to choose between discrete alternatives (matches) characterized
by hours of work, H(z), the wage rate, W(z), and non-pecuniary attributes
represented by a latent variable, T(z). We assume that the individuals
choose the alternatives that maximizes utility given the constraints and
the attributes summarized in T(z).
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The present paper assumes that the utility function has the structure
(3) U(h,C,z) = v(h,C,T(z)) + e(z)
where v(.,.,.) is a deterministic function in the sense that for given
values of h, C, and T, v is a constant. e(z) is a random term that accounts
for unobserved heterogeneity in the preferences relative to z.
For the purpose of empirical implementation we have to derive densities
for the observed wages and labor supply.
Now, let G1 (w,t,h) be the probability that a randomly selected match,
z, satisfies (W(z)4w, T(z)t, O<H(z)01). In other words, G i(w,t,h) is the
fraction of feasible matches for which (W(z)(w, T(z)(t, O<H(z)(h). We
411 	 assume that the corresponding density gi (w,t,h) exists. Furthermore, let
g2(w,h) = ig i (w,t,h)dt
which is a density representing the frequency of market matches with hours
h and wages w, and let
•





which is defined for h>0 and for hEK where K is the set of feasible hours.•	 In eq.(4) the unobserved non-pecuniary attributes of jobs are integrated
out. (1) can be interpreted as a mean utility function derived from the
distribution of individual utilities across all matches, conditional on
H(z)=h and W(z)=w.
In addition to (1) and (2) assume that
(i) the utilities are stochastically independent and identically
distributed across matches,
(ii) the individual selects the optimal match according to the Luce-axiom:
"independence from irrelevant alternatives".
Under these assumptions we get the following probability of working h








where C(x) = f(wx+I).
Next, we assume that W(z) and H(z) are independent, i.e.,
g2(w,h)	 g3(h)g4(w).
Then (5) reduces to
(6) 0 (h,K1w) = exp 4(x,C(x),w))g3(x) •
x>0
xEK
The extension to the married couple case is straightforward. The joint








where (h z ) are hours and matches for sex j. C is household consumption,
(8) 	 C = f(wmhm, wFhF, I),
and where now f(*) represents the function that transforms household income
to household consumption.
The analogue to (6) is
exp 4(h,C(h),w))g3(h)
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exp(ghwhF ,f(wmhm ,wFhF ,I)))g3m (hm )g3F (hF )
(9) 4(hm ,hF ,K1wwwF )=
As in (4) cp may in general depend on (wF, wm) in addition to hours and
consumption but this is suppressed here.
(I) and g3i are parametrized by socioeconomic characteristics while the
budget set represented by the function f in (9) follows from the tax rules.
These rules are explained in detail in Appendix 2.
The cp-function applied is a second order approximation to the true
function and it is specified as follows:
(10) ghm ,hF , C ) 2	 2cciC+a2C +a3LF+a4LF+a5 (logAF )LF+a 6(logy 2LF





where C is household consumption, L i is leisure time of sex j, defined as
L = 8760-h	 A is age, B136 is number of children 6 years or less, B717
is number of children between 7 and 17, and j=M(ale), F(emale). Moreover,
411 	I 1 if at least one in the household owns the home
A191-
0 otherwise




Furthermore, the densities g 3j are specified as follows:
(11) g 3F (hF ) a dFexp [ (hF 4TiF ) 2aF+bFiDi (hF)+bF2D2 (hF)+bF3D3 (hF) + bF4A13hF




a d b. b b	 bF4 and	 are all unknown coefficients,
1 if member in 'white-collar' unions
Al3 =
0 otherwise ,
1 if h E[2040, 2120]
D 1 (h j) =









The interval [2040,2120], which is equivalent to around 40 hours per
week, covers the range of hours in full time jobs while the two other
intervals cover the range of hours in part time jobs, 30 hours per week and
20 hours per week, respectively.
Let
(13) 4)*(hm,hF,wm,wF) 	 4)(hm,hF,f(wliihm,wFhp,I))+I[logd44-a4(hi-fi'i)2
ja8F,M J J
3
+b A h +b D(h ))+I b D(h )j4 13 j	 lj 1 j	 i.2 Fi i F
and observe that (9) can be expressed by 4)1*(8). From (10) and (13) it is
evident that the latent rationing of hours cannot be disentangled from
preferences. However, if we keep the rationing densitiesg3j( 8) fixed we
are able to perform simulation experiments.
e
3. Data.
The sources of the data set, together with the description of the tax
rules, are set out in two appendices. Here it suffices to give some summary
statistics of the sample for the most important variables appearing in the
model.
Data contains socioeconomic information about married couples in Sweden
in 1981. Age of the wife is restricted to be between 27 and 64 and self-
employed are excluded from the sample. Moreover, observations in each tail
of the wage distribution is selected out. (Those with reported wage below
10 SWkr and above 170 SOkr are excluded.) The data set includes 1649 obser-
vations of married couplei.
Table 1 gives the summary statistics and figures 1 and 2 give the fre-
quencies of hours worked by males and females, respectively. We observe the
extreme concentration around full time and part time jobs. This may partly
be due to measurement error since annual hours of work is obtained by
multiplying reported hours a week by number of weeks.





Table 1. Summary statistics for 1649 married couple, Sweden 1981.
Variables	 Mean	 Stand.dev. Min.value Max.value 	 Units
Hours worked by males	 2021.26	 327.86	 240	 3484	 hours a year
Hours worked by females 1542.69	 516.58	 120	 3286








females	 0.11	 0.32	 0	 1.0
Part-time, 20h/week*,
female 	 0.16 	 0.37 	 0 	 1.0
	
1111111,
Hourly wage rate males	 54.88	 21.92	 11.40	 163.30	 SEK/hour
Hourly wage rate
females	 41.64	 14.72	 11.23	 167.10
Gross earnings males 1) 109512	 47264	 0	 639200	 SEK a year
Gross earnings,




males 0.63	 0.14	 0.22	 0.85 MID
Marginal tax rate,
females
	 0.47	 0.14	 0	 0.88
Net taxes paid by
households	 60465	 34786	 2924	 407096
Household consumption 116849	 29557	 31224	 310654
Number of children
below 7	 0.38	 0.65	 0	 3.0
Number of children
between 7,17	 0.80	 0.92	 0	 7.0
Age, males	 43.48	 9.76	 22.0	 64.0
Age, females	 41.06	 9.33	 27.0	 63.0
Own-house fraction	 0.63	 0.48	 0	 1.0






1) Gross earnings are defined as gross wage income after the deduction of
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5. Estimation results 
The estimation of the model is based on a procedure suggested by
McFadden (1981) which yields results that are close to the full information
maximum likelihood method. We are not able to use the exact likelihood
function to estimate the model because the evaluation of the integrals in
(9) would be to costly and cumbersome. The procedure applied goes as
follows. In addition to the observed hours of work we make 140 draws of
hours for each spouse from an uniform distribution over the interval [60,
3600]. These draws are used to evaluate the denominator in (9). The unknown
.coefficients in the labor supply distribution are estimated in a modified
maximum likelihood procedure. According to McFadden (1981) these estimates
are consistent and asymptotically normal.





























Table 2. Estimates of the parameters of the labor supply model for,
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All the estimates have the expected sign and most of the coefficients
are significantly different from zero with the cross leisure term as a
noteworthy exception. The estimates imply that the 'mean utility' function
(e) is strictly concave in consumption and leisure. The model allows the
marginal 'utility' of leisure (marginal of e) to be negative even at the
point of adjustment which might be due to constraints on hours. This event
occurs for some of the individuals in the sample, but in most cases the
marginal 'utility' of leisure is positive. It is a convex function of age
with a minimum at 37.9 years of age and 39.4 for females and males,
respectively.
The more children the couple has, especially below 6 years of age, the
less inclined the wife is to supply labor in the market. Males labor supply
is not significantly affected.
Ownership to the couples hame has a positive impact on the labor supply
of the husband, most likely because of rationing in the credit market.
The lack of suitable job opportunities in rural areas is probably the
reason why female Libor supply is negatively affected when living in these
areas. Figure 7 and 8 give the predicted hours of work distribution for
males and females, respectively. The estimated model gives a fairly
good prediction of observed frequencies of hours worked (compare figures
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5. Wage elasticities and policy simulation 
5.1. Mean utility elasticities 
In previous studies of labor supply the error terms are typically
assumed independent of hours and consumption. This makes it possible to
calculate individual wage elasticities. In our model this is not so because
the error term depends on the optimal match which in turn depends on hours
worked.
The conditional expected utility, 4), defined in (4) and evaluated for
mean sample values, is the utility concept that comes closest to the one
used by others in the calculation of elasticities.
However, the likelihood function is a mixture of (1) and the densities,
g3j . We are not able to separate (1) from g3i without introducing further
assumptions. But if a shift in an exogeneous variable does not change the
'rationing' densities, then elasticities calculated on the basis of e is
equivalent to elasticities calculated from cp.
With these reservations in mind we have calculated mean utility-mean
sample elasticities, given that he or she works, on the basis of the fol-
lowing set of equations:
(14) . 	C =Emh +I,
j
(15) •) 	 -) 	10._	 0
M 	 8C 	 m m
(16) W(-) 4*(40 . 	 mm 0
ÓC -F 	 •61,M
1
where m = w (1-S ) = marginal wage rate; j=11,F,
A
si I(1•Sid + E d = virtual income,ib
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jbjb
and d 4b 	E t ick 	 F tkik_i •
k-1
Rk Rk-1 denotes the size of the tax-bracket k measured in SEK. tk is the
marginal tax rate on tax segment k. jb is the optimal tax bracket for the
representative individual.
The elasticities are denoted an utility elasticities and the
following ones are shown in table 3:
uncompensated elasticities, hours h i with respect to wj (Cournot
elasticities)
compensated or utility constant elasticities (Slutsky)
total income elasticities (Cournot minus Slutsky)
consumption constant elasticities (Frisch elasticities).
Table 3. Mean utility wage and income elasticities
calculated at an sample values of the variables. Sweden 1981.
• Type of elasticity 	 Males 	 Females 
Own 	 Cross 	 Own 	 Cross 
Cournot 	 0.08 	 -0.07 	 0.13 	 -0.11
Slutsky 	 0.46 	 -0.01 	 0.22 	 -0.04
Total income 	 -0.38 	 - 	 -0.09 	 -
Frisch 	 - - - - - 'Oafs- 	----- --• 0 -4;01---- • 	 0.16 	 0.01
The direct Cournot elasticities are numerically law which is in ac-
cordance with the conventional wisdom in Scandinavian countries. The esti-
mate of the male elasticity is even identical to the estimate reported in
Blomquist (1983) and elasticities do not deviate very much from estimates
obtained by applying the same model to Norwegian data from 1979; with one
exception, the female awn wage elasticity are substantially higher in the
Norwegian case, see Dagsvik and Strom (1988). There are some obvious
reasons why, Swedish women work an the average longer hours than in Norway.
Moreover, in the Swedish tax system married couples are taxed separately
while joint taxation is optional in Norway. From a socio-economic point of
24
view one should therefore expect Swedish women to have labor supply be-
havior more like Norwegian men and this is actually what our study
confirms. However, the Norwegian study is not immediately comparable since
in the Norwegian case annual hours of work is obtained by dividing labor
earnings by the reported wage rate. As mentioned above in the Swedish case
we use the reported hours worked during a 'normal week'.
Table 3 shows that while Cournot elasticities are numerically low, the
Slutsky elasticities, especially for men, are numerically significant. This
indicates loss in efficiency due to taxation.
We also note that the cross elasticities are numerically low which is
in accordance with what we have obtained for other countries, cf. the refe-
rences given above.
5.2 Aggregate elasticities 
Another set Cif elasticities arises when we consider how the
distribution of labor supply is affected by changes in say, wage levels.
These elasticities are-denoted aggregate elasticities since they take into
account all unobserved and observed heterogeneity in the population.
Note that expected aggregate labor supply is given by:
(17)	 H = Z 34(x)
A
where ' (x) is the aggregate (marginal) density of hours x. (x) can be
obtained by summing the respective household-specific densities over all
household characteristics. The aggregate elasticities shown in table 4 are
derived from applying the model to calculate the impact of one per cent
increase in wages on the labor supply decisions.
25




increased by 1 percent
Female wage rates
increased by 1 per cent
Both wage rates










By comparing he two tables we observe that the aggregate elasticities
are numerically smaller than the corresponding individual Cournot elastici-
ties. There are two reasons for this. In the first place heterogeneity
may reduce the wage response on the aggregate level. Secondly, when
calculating mean utility elasticities hours restriction are ignored while
this is not so in the calculation of aggregate elasticities. A striking
result is that except for the own female wage elasticity all elasticities
are negative. The reported elasticities for men are of the same size as the
elasticities reported in Ljones and Strom (1987), but the female elastici-
ties are substantially lower in absolute value and have opposite signs. The
explanation is most likely that in Ljones and Strom restriction on hours
were not accounted for in the same explicit way as ia the present study.
5.3 Policy simulations 
The model has been used to simulate the _outcome of 9 different policy
changes. In order to perform the simulations we have divided the feasible
set of hours into intervals of length 100 hours. Altogether this gives 1225
cells of hours that the couples are assumed to consider in making their
optimal choice. From the extreme value distribution we then make 1225 cor-
responding draws to simulate realizations of the error term e(z.m,zF) in the
utility function. These draws together with the midpoint of each cell form
the empirical basis for the simulations of the optimal decisions. For each
26
simulation we report the impact on
- aggregate labor supply of hours for men, women and total
- full-time/part-time fractions
- gross earnings, male, female and total
- taxes paid by the household and household consumption.
The policy changes considered are:
Male wage rates increased by 10 per cent
II • Female wage rates increased by 10 per cent
III Both female and male wage rates increased by 10 per cent
IV 	 Reduction in all marginal tax rates by 5 percentage points
V	 One child less in every household
VI	 Removal of hours restriction
VII Given VI; reduction in all marginal tax rates by 5 percentage points
VIII Separate taxation replaced by joint taxation.
IV	 As VIII, but tax revenue is kept constant.
The results are presented in table 5. The two first columns give the
observed and predicted values based on the model before wage rates, tax
rules, etc. are changed. All variables are expressed as average magnitudes
and are defined as the sum of individual realizations divided by the total
number of individuals in the sample.
The increase in wage rates has, in most cases, a negative, impact on
hours supplied. However, gross household earnings are increased by 3.62 per
cent when female wage rates are increased, and by 9.5 per cent when both
wage rates are increased. Taxes are increased even more so because of the
progressiveness of the tax schedule. We note that a 10 per cent overall
wage increase results ia a 5 per cent increase in household consumption. A
minor part of this difference is due to reduction in labor supply. In table
6 we have decomposed the effect of the policy changes into effects due to
changes in exogenous factors and effects that are due to behavioral
changes, i.e., reduction in labor supply. We observe that ia most of the
cases behavioral changes count for very little of the total change.
Reduction in all marginal tax rates by 5 percentage points, which im-
plies a loss of 11.45 per cent in tax revenue, stimulates labor supply but
only to a minor extent. Total hours supplied is calculated to increase by
0.17 per cent. The loss in tax revenue indicates that, given the present
tax system in Sweden, the tax rates are still below the levels which maxi-
mize tax revenue. Consumption is stimulated far more than gross earnings
27
which indicates an increase in imports and deterioration of the balance of
payments.
"One child less" has been included to show the impact on labor supply
(and other labor supply related variables) of child care. As expected fe-
male labor supply is stimulated with inter aha a shift from part-time work
to full-time jobs. These changes are substantially weaker than in other
European countries such as Norway, West-Germany and France, see Dagsvik and
Strom (1988), Dagsvik et al (1988) and Holst et al (1988). The most likely
reason is the quite generous permission rules after birth of a child in
Sweden compared with other countries. Although female labor supply is sti-
mulated more than in the other cases discussed so far, the impact on total'
earnings, tax revenue and consumption is not very strong.
The impact on the hours of work densities of removing restrictions on
hours is given in figures 9)1nd 10 and we clearly observe how drastic this
change is. (In this simulation experiment we have interpreted the extreme
peaks in hours distribution as the result of demand constraints). A
striking result reported in table 5 is that hours supplied are reduced,
pakticularly among females. It seems that introducing a "free thoice" of
hours will reduce labor supply, earnings and consumption. Due to the pre-
served progressiveness of the tax schedule tax revenue drops by more than
the reduction in total earnings. A tempting conclusion is that hours
restrictions imposed on Swedish workers have forced them to work longer
hours on the average than they prefer. When taxes are cut, given the re-
moval of hours restrictions, the labor supply becomes slightly more elastic
than in the 6ase of tax cuts in a regulated economy.
In contrast to most other countries Swedish couples are taxed separate-
ly, that is, wage incomes are taxed separately while capital incomes are
jointly taxed. To simulate the impact on labor supply of joint taxation of
all sorts of income we have applied the joint taxation schedule for capital
income on wage income as well. The results of this simulation are shown in
the last columns of table 5 and we observe that the effect on labor supply
is strong with an expected decrease in female labor supply. Also tax rates
for males are increased but to a smaller extent than for women. Male labor
supply is therefore reduced. Higher tax rates implied by this shift of tax
rules show up in higher tax revenue which is increased by as much as 30 per
cent.
In the last column we report the outcome of a tax neutral shift of tax
rules when separate taxation is replaced by joint taxation. All marginal
28
tax rates are reduced proportionally to get revenue down to the initial
level. The needed cut is 22 per cent. Female labor supply is still substan-
tial lower than in the base case (-3.36 per cent lower), but the males
working hours are almost brought back to initial levels. Of course, there
are many factors that contribute to the low female labor supply relative to
males in countries with joint taxation, but the simulations performed here




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 6. Changes in gross earnings, taxes and household consumption, pér
capita values, decomposed into behavioral changes and changes due to
variation in policy instruments.
Overall wage 	 Marginal tax
increase of 10 per cent 	 cut of 5 percentage points. 
Total change Percentage shares 	 Total Percentage shares
Variables 	 related to 	 related to
" SEK 	 Wage- 	 Be- 	 Change 	 Be-
changes - havioral SEK 	 Tax change havioral.
Gross house-
hold earnings 16699 	 105.1 	 -5.1 	 31 	 0 	 100
Taxes 	 7128 	 107.4 	 -7.4 	 -10918 	 99.3 	 0.7
Household























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Data used in this study is a subsample from the Swedish Income Distri-
bution Survey 1981 (HINK81), collected by the Central Bureau of Statistics
Sweden. These annual, representative cross section surveys contain primary
data from two rolling panels. Besides filled-in tax returns checked and
approved by the tax authorities, together with record data from the muni-
cipalities and the social security authorithies, there are survey data
based on interviews with both spouses. HINK81 contains about 9606 house-
holds and 24500 individuals, including children.
A HINK-household either. consists of two adults and their children (if
any), or one adult with or without children. A 18 years old (or older)
person is defined as an adult. Married people are considered as adults, no
matter their age. Cohabitants are defined as HINK-households provided that
they are old enough to be adults.
The data set includes married people or cohabitants with labor and
capital income. Households with business income'only or income from agri-
culture are excluded. The data set covers only working individuals. •
The women's age is between 26 and 65, while men aré included if they
are not older than 65. Individuals with hourly wage-rates below SEK 10 and
above SEK 170, and hours of work above 3600 are excluded from the sample.
The income variable used is "income from work", including sickness and
parental benefits. Annual hours worked are calculated as hours worked a
week times working weeks during the year. The hourly wage rate is calcu-
lated as income from work divided by hours worked a year. Dividing local
income taxes payed by local taxable income give "the local tax rate".
The non-taxable allowances included in disposable income are the fol-
lowing:






- allowances for children between 16 and 18 years old that study
- several kinds of pensions, life annuities and sickness benefits
- several payments while serving in the military
Of these allowances the housing allowances and the welfare payments
depend on the households income.
Dummy variables for region (A18), socioeconomic group (A13) and for
living in a house of their own (A19) are constructed as follows:
If the household is located in Stocholm, Gothenburg or Malmö, or in other
"large cities", A18=1. Otherwise A18=0. People normally organized in LO
(Labor Unions Organization) and "not classified people" are classified as
blue collar workers, that is A13 = O. Otherwise A13=1. If either the man or
the woman, or both of them own the house in which they live, A19=1.
Otherwise it is zero.
•
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APPENDIX 2: Swedish tax rules as of 1981.
In 1981 B-incomes mere still taxed jointly in Sweden. B-incomes are
mostly capital income. A-incomes or labor earnings are separately taxed.
A-income also include sick and parental benefits, and pension payments.
The tax rules for A-incomes can be described as follows. Let Ai denote the








A is the family income and a is the share of spouse j
(2) b lj	 100
	
1,2
where blj is deductions fdi expenses associated with work. If no expenses
are specified, one is allowed to deduct 100 SEK. Eqs. (1) and (2) give the
net income from labor. Total income is the sum of net income from other
sources and net income from labor. From total income several general de-
ductions are also p•rmitted (including deficits), of which we specify:
(3) b2j = mq ,	 j = M,F
in = number of children for whom expenses are paid when the
parents are separated.
q = the highest amount that could be deducted for each child,
that is SEK 3000.- as of 1981.
(4) b 3j = 0.25(A j-b 1 j )	 2000 .
b3 is deducted only if there is at least one child under the age of 16 in
the family, and the income earners have lived in Sweden more than half the
36
year.
To simplify matters, we add all the deductions: 
CS)
3




The amounts subject to assessment for national income taxes, denoted E 	 is
then calculated as follows:
(6)
	
Eg 0A —B =F
s 	
M,F" •
For 1981 this assessed income, with some exceptions, is the same as
federal taxable income (Fs). From assessed income we then deduct at most







j 	 2 j = M,F1
where F
k 
is local taxable income,
g
r 
is the basic deduction of 6000 SEK
and 	 g
a 
is the guarantee amount for real property in the municipality,
National income taxes follow from (6) and the federal tax schedule for










where T is the local taxe rate and G  are the local income taxes in region
k.
The sum of income taxes is given by:
(9)
	
j = M,F, 	 k =
37
S .where G is the national income tax.
There is an upper bound on marginal taxes. Let
	
(10)	I- E	 H .
j=M,F
Related to H i and I there are the following two rules:
H 4 0.80(F 	 IMO), if (F S. - 5400) < 192000
J
	(11)	 H. 4 0.80(Fs - 4500)+0.85(F. - 4500-192000),
J 	 J 	 J
if FS. > 192000
J
j = M,F
for people taxed separately and
I 4 0.80 	 E (Fs - 4500), if E (Fs - 4500) 4 192000
j=M,F i=M,F
(12) I 4 0.80	 E (Fs 	 4500)+0.85 	 E (Fs 	 4500-192000),
j=M,F j=M,F
if	 E (Fs - 4500) > 192000
j=M,F j
for people taxed jointly.
Ordinary tax reductions are calculated as:
J -	 a(Y - Eg)	 if Eg < yJ
(13)
JO 0
i 	 ' if Eg > y
	 i,j	 F,M, i * j
where coil for a person who has lived in Sweden and where the spouse also
has lived in Sweden more than half of 1981,
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and a=0.5 for a person who has lived in Sweden and where the spouse has
lived less than half of 1981,
and 0=0.3, y=6000 for people taxed jointly. Furthermore,
(14) J
o 
= a•1800 for single persons with children under the age of
18, living at home.
Special tax reductions are calculated as:
J
s 
= 560, if Fs 4 40000,
JS. = 560+0.10(F
s 	




= 1060, if 45000 < Fs 4 60000,
= 1060-0.03(F
s 




= 560, if FS > 77600
	
j = F,M.
Total income tax for the household is then given by:
(16) K
le _ 	 E fjo 	 „TS.,
J./4,F	 jj
where Ie is the sum of national and local income taxes after the limitation
rule have been used, but before tax reductions.
The net amount of income taxes, transfer payments and benefits denoted
R, is calculated as follows:
(17) R =K+ 0 -P+N- nQ + mQ + Tf ,
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where 0 is housing allowances,
P is children allowances,
N is recommended fees for dhildrens daycare,
Q is maintenance for children,
n is the number of children for whom maintenance for children is
received,
m is the number of children for whom maintenance of children is
paid,
Tf is the real property tax on houses.
The basis for housing allowances and fees for childrens day care are
41/ 	 both depending on the family income.
(16) and (17) now give us the average income taxes (X), marginal taxes








(19) Yv+5 ma 5000 	 n = 10..,395
11 5 - Rv (20) Z = 	 , 	 Nr gg 1,...,3955000
where 	 v = 1 for A = 1000 SEK and
•
v . = 395 for A = 395000 SEK.
For jointly taxed people the national B-incomes are taxed on. top of the
highest federal taxable A- income in the household. The amount is then
divided referring to how large the B-incomes are for each spouse.
In Figures 11-14 we show how X,Y and Z vary with income in four dif-
fereht types of household. The figures clearly demonstrate that the total
tax and transfer system in Sweden is not uniformly progressive. Total
marginal effects from income taxes, day nursery fees and housing allowances









Tax—schedules for wage earners 1981. Married couples/cohabitants with 2
children and 2 incomes from employment. Both children in kindergarten.
Local tax rate: 30%. Income steps: 1000 SEK.
FAMILY GROSS INCOME FROM EMPLOYMENT (in thousands SEK)
(64% + 36Z from each spouse)
Y = Marginal Income Taxes after income changes by SEK 5 000
Z m Total Marginal Effects from Income Taxes, Kindergarten Fees and Housing
Allowances after income changes by SEK 5 000
X = Net average Taxes/Subsidies from Income Taxes, Kindergarten Fees,
Housing Allowances and Child Allowances after income changes by
SEK 5 000
1) The fees for childrens day care begin to increase with the family
income.
2) The housing allowances begin to decline with the family income.
3) The break even point for paying (net) income taxes.
4) The housing allowances decline to zero.
5) The fees for childrens day care stop increasing.
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Figure 12. 	 •
Tax—schedules for wage earners 1981. Married woman/cohabitant with 2
children and 2 incomes from employment. Both children in kindergarten.
Local tax rate: 30%. Income steps: 1000 SEK.
X,Y,Z (%)
z0	 313
INDIVIDUAL GROSS INCOME FROM EMPLOYMENT (in thousands SEK)
(The other spouse earns SEK 128 000 a year, which corresponds to full—time
work for mn in 1981.)
Y = Marginal Income Taxes after income changes by SEK 5 000
Z = Total Marginal Effects from Income Taxes, Kindergarten Fees and Housing
Allowances after income changes by SEK 5 000
X = Net average Taxes/Subsidies from Income Taxes, Kindergarten Fees,
Housing Allowances and Child Allowances after income changes by
SEK 5 000
1) The fees for childrens day care stop increasing.
2) Net average taxes/subsidies at its lowest level.
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Figure 13.
Tax—schedules for wage earners 1981. Married man/cohabitant with 2
children. 2 incomes from employment. Both children in kindergarten. Local
tax rate: 30%. Income steps: 1000 SEK.
X,Y,Z (%)
o	 to 	 zo	 Zt3
INDIVIDUAL GROSS INCOME FROM EMPLOYMENT (in thousands SEK)
(The other spouse earns SEK 72 000 a - year, which correspc-mds to full—time
work for women in average the income year 1981.)
Y = Marginal Income Taxes after income changes by SEK 5 000
Z = Total Marginal Effects from Income Taxes, Kindergarten Fees and Housing
Allowances after income changes by SEK 5 000
X = Net average Taxes/Subsidies from Income Taxes, Kindergarten Fees,
Housing Allowances and Child Allowances after income changes by
SEK 5 000
1) The housing allowances decline to zero.




Tax—schedules for wage earners 1981. Married man/cohabitant with 2
children. 2 incomes from employment. Both children in kindergarten.
Local tax rate: 30%. Income steps: 1000 SEK.
X,Y,Z (%)
INDIVIDUAL GROSS INCOME FROM EMPLOYMENT (in thousands SEK)
(The other spouse earns SEK 36 000 a year, which corresponds to a half—time
work for women in average the income year 1981.)
Y = Marginal Income Taxes after income changes by SEK 5 000
Z = 'Total Marginal Effects from Income Taxes, Kindergarten Fees and Housing
Allowances after income changes by SEK 5 000
X = Net average Taxes/Subsidies from Income Taxes, Kindergarten Fees,
Housing Allowances and Child Allowances after income changes by
SEK 5 000
1) The break even point for paying (net) income taxes.
2) The housing allowances decline to zero.
3) The fees for childrens day care stop increasing.
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